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1. Introduction 
 
Quite often, in conversation with trainee teachers of Japanese, most of 
whom are native speakers of the language, I have heard statements about 
the Japanese language, to the effect that “Japanese is ambiguous” (‘aimai’) 
or that Japanese “don’t say things clearly” (‘hakkiri iwanai’). For a 
language with an exceptionally rich repertoire of devices specialized in 
marking the speaker’s stance vis-à-vis the proposition or other speech 
participants (see for example Narrog 2007 on modal markers), statements 
such as these can appear contradictory. And yet, they are far from unusual. 
In a study of seventy native speakers of Japanese, Haugh (1998: 40) found 
that up to 77% of them agreed/strongly agreed with the statement “spoken 
Japanese is vague”, while only 10% disagreed. Moreover, this view is 
sustained by native and non-native users alike, and perpetuated not only in 
popular books about Japan and the Japanese people, but also in many 
pedagogical grammars, textbooks, and classroom instruction. This paper 
sets out to deconstruct this discourse and tease apart the truth from the 
stereotype.  
Stereotypes, the result of our ability to ‘typify’ linguistic usages, 
gestures, clothing, looks (i.e. different semiotic systems), are of course 
crucial to our ability to learn and function in the world. They allow us to 
reduce the infinite variations of people, linguistic forms or other entities to 
a few, manageable, categories. But when, as in language classrooms, we 
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aim at developing intercultural awareness or a linguistic competence that 
goes beyond the recognition of basic formulae and patterns and aspires to 
facilitate the learner’s appreciation of subtle nuances, stereotypes stand in 
the way. Effective communication (and learning) crucially depends on the 
ability to maintain a degree of flexibility whereby novel situations are not 
invariably reduced to the already known. Overgeneralizations can ‘frame’ 
the character of a language or a culture, and produce fixed and often crude 
images which are then hard to shred, hindering, for example, our 
sensitivity to variability within a culture. Moreover, stereotypes are not 
neutral representations: they come hand in hand with evaluative 
judgements that often go undetected but play a huge role in our 
understanding of what actually goes on during interaction. Such 
evaluations forestall our understanding of the underlying values that 
arguably direct certain behaviour, by reflecting more the mindset of the 
evaluator than the values held by the person evaluated. 
Attempts to challenge and deconstruct stereotypes (as can be seen, for 
example, in the well researched area of gendered language) often aim to 
highlight the lack of evidence for their existence. But stereotypes do not 
emerge in a vacuum, and it is somewhat condescending, in my view, not to 
acknowledge the pervasiveness of such conceptions and explore the 
modalities of their genesis. The perception of ‘indirectness’, ‘ambiguity’ 
or ‘vagueness’ on the part of native and non-native users and 
commentators must be recognized, although accompanied by a great deal 
of qualification.  
This paper assumes that statements about a ‘typical’ Japanese style are 
psychologically real for many users of the language, i.e. they are the result 
of genuine perceptions about the way in which communication in Japanese 
is conducted. It attempts to tease out the factors that may lead to such 
perceptions, and discuss ways in which we can talk about the Japanese 
language or the Japanese people in a classroom. I intend to do this by 
reflecting upon my own experience and perceptions in communication 
with Japanese speakers, and by exposing, to the best of my diagnostic 
capacities, the spontaneous responses and analytical reasoning I have 
made use of in making sense of these interactions. I will be therefore base 
my discussion on my own feelings and thoughts in two different 
capacities: as a participant in a communicative event conducted in 
Japanese, and as a researcher involved in a post-hoc reading of the data.  
I begin by presenting some received characterizations of the Japanese 
style as they are reported in linguistic and ethnographic literature (section 
2), and then analyze the notion of ‘indirectness’ in linguistic and 
behavioural terms (section 3). After that I discuss the dynamics of a 
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communicative encounter (section 4), and suggest ways in which 
impressions and evaluations are formed, on the basis of the evidence 
available to participants (section 5). Here I attempt to provide an account 
of evaluative judgements in cognitive terms, by formalizing the 
interpretive processes involved in terms of inferences drawn from 
linguistic signs, through the lenses of specific interactional frames, and the 
socio-cognitive categories of values held by participants. I will whenever 
possible highlight the relevance of the analysis proposed here to 
pedagogical issues, and conclude with recommendations for language 
teachers.  
2. Characterizations of the ‘Japanese’1  
communicative style 
Japanese is overwhelmingly characterized as a language with a distinct 
preference for ‘indirectness’ (see Lebra 1976; Miller 1994; Kubota 1999 
for reviews and critiques). The following excerpt from Patricia Clancy 
(1986)’s work on the acquisition of Japanese style is a paradigmatic 
illustration of how Japanese is often characterized in lay, as well as 
academic, discourse.  
 
It is widely recognized that the communicative style of the Japanese is 
intuitive and indirect, especially compared with that of Americans. As 
Azuma et al (1980) have said, a verbal expression among the Japanese is 
“context dependent, indirect, rich in connotation and evasive in 
denotation”. The basis of this style is a set of cultural values that 
emphasize omoiyari, ‘empathy’ over explicit verbal communication. 
(1980: 213). 
 
Clancy goes on to mention that ‘verbosity’ has traditionally been 
looked down in Japan (iwanu ga hana = ‘silence is better than speech’), 
especially in men speech; that ‘talkativeness’ is equated with insincerity 
                                                
1 The data presented in this paper is Tokyo Japanese, arguably the standard variety 
(but see: Long 1999), which is said to form the basis for language instruction. Most 
of the commentary I report here, including Clancy’s, similarly refer to this variety, 
although the empirical question remains of whether other varieties of Japanese are 
also evaluated in a similar way by speakers of other languages. Some of my 
Japanese informants, for example, talk of the Osaka variety as being considerably 
more direct and often blunt. This exemplifies the point made in this paper about 
the need for much more delicate analyses—and descriptions in the classroom—of 
what counts as “Japanese”.  
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and superficiality (1986: 214). When verbal communication does occur, 
“[…] it will often be inexplicit and indirect”. With regards to its linguistic 
features, she quotes research by Doi that points out that “[…] the structure 
of the Japanese language fosters ambiguity in various ways: the language 
is pro-drop, admits the pragmatic elision of elements retrievable 
contextually, and allows the omission of the final part of a sentence, which 
in Japanese corresponds to the main predicate (SOV). All of this conveys 
the impression that the Japanese are “reserved, cautious, and evasive” 
(1986: 214). Clancy goes on to comment on the underlying values 
arguably triggering this style; besides ‘empathy’ mentioned earlier, she 
refers to the strive toward “social harmony” (which requires the avoidance 
of “overt expression of conflict”), and the notional distinction between 
honne (real feelings) vs. tatemae (socially accepted principles). This 
entails that Japanese speakers are indeed capable of harbouring individual 
opinions, feelings and thoughts, but that these are underplayed whenever 
they have the potential to generate friction during social interaction, giving 
rise to a more anonymous, ‘safe’, style. Consequently, verbal interaction is 
no more than a ‘mind-reading game’ (sasshi, bp): “In interpreting the 
response to a direct request, therefore, one must be ready to guess what the 
speaker probably means, even in spite of what may actually be said” 
(1986: 216).  
Moreover, with regards to the social domain generating all this, she 
maintains that: 
 
Clearly, the Japanese style of communication can work only in a rather 
homogenous society in which people actually can anticipate each other’s 
needs, wants and reactions. Japanese society is, in fact, extremely 
homogenous […] in Japan, where interpersonal communication relies so 
heavily upon intuition and empathy, conformity to group norms can be 
seen as an essential aspect of communicative style […] one striking aspect 
of the language that is related to conformity is the existence of a great 
number of fixed verbal formulas […] speakers need only indicate, by 
means of the right formula, that they are experiencing the right kind of 
reaction, without expressing any more personal, individualized response. 
An important goal of socialization in Japan is to promote the unanimity in 
feeling that will support the norms of verbal agreement and empathy. 
(1986: 216) 
 
Finally, she characterizes the contrast between American and Japanese 
styles by the different emphasis on participant responsibility. While 
American speakers are invested with the responsibility to express their 
feelings and thoughts clearly and explicitly in their words (hence the 
popularity of assertiveness training) it is Japanese listeners who have to do 
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the job, as they must figure out what the speaker means “regardless of the 
words used”.  
Other accounts of Japanese indirectness link it to the collectivistic 
nature of Japanese society, or cultural inclinations such as the reliance on 
tacit communication, the expectation of mutual understanding without the 
need for open expressions of personal needs and ideas, hierarchy 
consciousness, a desire for harmony (for a review, see Miyamoto-Tanaka 
and Bell 1996), and a number of cultural ‘key-words’ such as haragei (lit. 
“belly art”, or ‘heart-to-heart communication’, a propensity for non-verbal 
communication), ishin denshin (lit. “from mind to mind”, or telepathic 
communication), sasshi (“surmise”, “guess”), etc2. Like Clancy’s last 
excerpt, many of these accounts (most of which are not surprisingly 
derived from contrastive studies with American English) iconize this style 
as the product of a homogeneous society, an assumption whose uncritical 
and ideological nature has been critiqued by Befu (2001), or Kubota 
(2003), among others.  
Anyone with a certain degree of familiarity with Japan or the Japanese 
language will find some aspects of this commentary undoubtedly true—
but some other excessively stereotypical and overgeneralizing. This paper 
objects to a few major points. 
First of all, a model of communication that dichotomizes speaker vs. 
listener responsibility in exchanging information (see also Okazaki 1993 
on such a view) is highly questionable (a reflexive, dialogic, interactionist 
view of language points to the collaborative, co-constructive and 
intersubjective nature of discourse structure and meaning representation; 
see also Clark [1996: 3]: “language use is a form of joint action”3). We 
could assume however, that this is only another way to say that an indirect 
style leaves more possibilities open for interpretation than a direct style.  
                                                
2 It is worth noting that research on writing styles (a different kind of participation 
framework from that of face-to-face interaction) points to similar perceptions with 
regards to written styles. Students in a study by Kubota in 1992 (quoted in Connor 
1996: 44) judge Japanese and English texts as follows: “Japanese text is indirect, 
ambiguous, roundabout, illogical, digressive, has the main idea at the end, and 
contains a long introductory remark and long, complex sentences; English is direct, 
clear, logical, has the main idea stated at the beginning, and has unity in the 
paragraph and little digression”. The issue of their generalizability from specific 
genres or specific examples to overall cultural traits is a highly debated topic 
(Kubota 1997). 
3 “Joint actions” and “joint intentions”, are not just 'my actions/intentions plus your 
actions/intentions’ but ‘our actions/intentions’ and ‘my role in this is such-and-
such’ and ‘your role in this is such-and-such’ (Jackendoff 2007: 172, my italics). 
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Secondly, claiming that linguistic features (e.g. the pro-drop nature of 
the language) have an unmediated impact on the representation of social 
personae (the consequent perceived evasiveness of Japanese people) 
suggests a rather deterministic view of language as an independently 
motivated (and somewhat tyrannical) agent. It presupposes a unilateral 
effect of language upon culture while neglecting observations on the 
effects of culture on language. This also entails an unjustified focus on 
meanings that are explicitly marked and a neglect of inferential 
mechanisms, conventionalized patterns of elliptical communication, and 
the fact that meanings are ‘scattered’ in discourse over multiple morpho-
syntactic devices.  
But generalizations such as we have seen in the passage above are 
problematic in other, important, ways. One is their extreme essentialization: 
needless to say, both direct and indirect styles are possible, and attested, in 
Japanese, depending on the situation, interactional goals, genres (Trent 
1997: 423, Matsumoto and Okamoto 2003: 31), etc., and both can, 
depending on the circumstance, be perceived as ‘marked’ (contrary-to-
expectation) behaviour. The indirect style attributed to Japanese speakers 
as a whole is indeed a recognizable style, but one of many, and its 
essentialist reduction to the Japanese style (see e.g. Hirokawa 1987; Okabe 
1987; Tsujimura 1987) has been attributed to an orientalist discourse 
subscribed to by Japanese and non-Japanese researchers alike (Kubota 
1999, 2003), as well as folk discourse on culture (Haugh 1998; see also 
Miller 1982: 84 ff. on the contradictions of the stereotypes). 
A concomitant issue is the failure, in most accounts, to deconstruct the 
notion of indirectness, and to recognize the seamless shift from a 
description of textual features to evaluative, judgmental comments on the 
quality of talk, that inevitably involves particular standpoints, failing to 
account for which results in the adoption of biased and ethnocentric 
positions. The evaluative statement that the preferred communicative style 
in Japanese is indirect is a relative matter—relative, that is, to the position 
of the source of the judgement, and the object of comparison. It is clear 
that in the absence of a comparative measure (be that a different style or a 
different expectation), indirect talk is just talk (Channell 1994: 4 on ‘vague 
language’ going unnoticed most of the time). So, along with questions 
about Japanese language and culture, one should ask questions about the 
language and culture of the person producing such evaluation, and about 
the interactional goals allegedly frustrated by indirectness.  
Indirectness is of course intrinsically neither good nor bad, but 
contextually—when social activities and social identities are at stake—it 
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can have a positive or negative evaluation (Holtgraves 1997: 6344), 
respectively: ‘rapport’ (because it opens space for others to fill, Tannen 
2005: 255), or ‘manipulation’ (because the inferred meaning can be 
withdrawn at a later stage), evasiveness, vagueness, etc.  
A few challenges to the axiom of Japanese indirectness have come 
from quantitative studies. Gudykunst et al. (1996) claim that self-construal 
and personal values are better predictors than nationality in predicting low- 
or high-context communication styles. Neuliep and Hazelton (1985) 
investigate Japanese and American compliance-gaining (persuasive) 
strategies, and find that depending on the situation, Japanese were as likely 
or significantly more likely to prefer direct requesting strategies than 
Americans. The three preferred Japanese strategies in fact seemed to be 
‘explanation’, ‘direct request’ and, crucially, ‘deceit’ (an unexpected result 
for the authors, but that, as we will see, makes good sense for the present 
study). Miyamoto-Tanaka and Bell (1996), in a cross-cultural test of 
Bavelas et al.’s situational theory of equivocation (see below in section 3), 
note that Japanese students did not produce more equivocal messages than 
their American counterparts, and that the communication in which the 
sender and receiver were not identified (as in common pragmatic 
omissions in Japanese) were not perceived as ambiguous by task judges. 
Interestingly, Miller (1994: 46) points out that in intercultural encounters, 
Japanese and American participants may have post-facto characterized the 
interactions in stereotypic ways even where such consistent tendencies 
could not be observed by the researcher. Her observations suggest that 
‘objective’ measurements (e.g. of specific linguistic forms alleged to be 
vehicles of indirectness) that neglect participants’ interactional goals may 
miss an important component of what causes a message to be perceived as 
indirect.  
In spite of such counterevidence and in the absence of studies focused 
on participants’ perceptions and evaluations of indirectness, with the bulk 
of ethnographic commentaries as well popular literature on Japanese 
culture so overwhelmingly and solidly supporting such stereotypes, it is 
easy to see how language teachers and teaching materials are compelled to 
perpetuate the same message (see Kubota 1999; Matsumoto and Okamoto 
2003, for calls to raise teachers’ awareness). Language-classroom 
instruction, which must accommodate the need to provide guidelines for 
                                                
4 The same of course applies to directness: ‘very direct’ is ‘pushy’ but also 
‘competent’ and ‘powerful’.  
5 “By leaving maximal information for the hearer to fill in, a speaker is creating 
involvement by requiring the hearer to participate in sense making” (Tannen 2005: 
25). 
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conduct in a foreign culture economically, under huge constrains of time 
and space, is inherently subject to the seductive allure of simplifying 
statements (a point made very forcefully by critical discourse analysts). 
But lest we are happy to unwilling support some kind of moral education, 
we have a duty to unpack the stereotypes. 
In this paper I attempt to describe a case of perceived indirectness and 
evasiveness, and I try to tease out the factors that contribute to such a 
judgement. I will try to demonstrate that perceptions of indirectness do 
indeed rest on some observable features of the message that can 
‘objectively’ be described as indirect, but that an overall judgement of 
indirectness can only result from participants’ different understanding of 
the nature and goal of the activity under way, and the differentially salient 
interactional values that these activities subsume (even when participants 
seem to be going through the motions of an activity without any obvious 
interactional hiccup).  
3. The purposes of indirectness 
In actual intercultural encounters (as well as in educational and 
language teaching contexts), charges of indirectness and vagueness against 
the Japanese language or the Japanese people reveal some sort of 
communicative problem for which the ‘Japanese style’ is supposed to be 
responsible. Although a scientific analysis attempts to use this term in an 
impartial, descriptive way, it too can fail to highlight the argumentative 
positioning that this evaluation entails, and to address questions such as 
“what does that indirectness do for a (Japanese) speaker”, “for whom is 
Japanese indirect or ambiguous”, “what are the purposes it crosses”, etc.  
Indirectness is not just lack of something: lack of clarity, transparency, 
or in the worse case (but this too is attested, see Befu 2001: 37), lack of 
logic. Something does get communicated by the use of an indirect means, 
and my claim will be that this is an ideology, i.e. a particular constellation 
of moral values and norms of (verbal) behaviour. When the same 
constellation of values is seen to be at work on a large scale we may 
indeed talk of a cultural tendency, but this is subject to quantitative testing. 
Here, I will not make any claims about the cultural scope of this style, but 
will treat it as a widespread style that is certainly widely recognized and 
actively used by many individuals (in Japan as elsewhere, although I will 
focus on the devices signalling indirectness in Japanese); I will attempt to 
describe the ideology it subtends, and speculate about the type of 
interactional role and social situations likely to trigger it, but will not be 
able to qualify its statistical frequency.  
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Indirectness has traditionally been linked to politeness or facework 
(Lakoff 1973; Searle 1975; Leech 1983; Brown and Levinson 1987 
[1978]; Minami 1987), and therefore to power differential between 
interlocutors, including relational variables that are assumed to mirror or 
be subsumed by power differential, such as gender of interlocutors, or 
institutional roles. But some of these, and other studies, have also pointed 
out that indirectness is not, or not only, a function of politeness: Kamio 
(1990, 2002)’s functional analysis relates it to the cognitive notion of 
‘information territories’; for Caffi (2007) it is a kind of ‘mitigation’, a 
device to express uncertainty, caution, consideration, i.e. a way to “[…] 
attune to others” that, beyond mere considerations of politeness, aims at 
“avoiding unnecessary risks, responsibilities and conflicts” (2007: 3). 
While facilitating a ‘smooth’ management of the interaction, it has a 
payoff for the user as well: it “[…] reduces the risks that the participants 
may incur on various levels, for instance, the risk of self-contradiction (at 
a discourse level), the risk of refusal, conflict, or losing face (at a social 
level) etc.” (2007: 40), However, she also notes the paradox whereby 
mitigation “presents the speaker as tactful, considerate, obliging, but at the 
same time calculating, distant, non-immediate”. For Bavelas et al. (1990), 
indirectness (a trait of the more general notion of ‘equivocation’) is one of 
the signals of a speaker’s attempt at resolving an interactional tension. 
They claim that equivocation is an attractive communicative choice when 
telling an outright lie is troubling, but telling the truth is at odd with self-
interest or risks hurting the receiver, or when one must communicate to 
two groups holding different viewpoints (1996: 224). Hence equivocation 
seems to be a strategy functional to social alignment and (self-)face-
maintenance. For Stubbs (1986) it is related to Goffman’s notion of 
‘footing’, and to more general notions of ‘commitment and detachment’ in 
speaker stance; the significance he attributes to these notions leads him to 
even ask whether we can think of indirectness merely as a question of 
‘style’ if “[…] being explicit changes the meaning” (1986: 6), a point also 
made by Channell (1994: 13) in her discussion of the social purposes of 
‘vague’ language.  
In the following discussion I will refer back to these studies and show 
in what way these functions are evidenced in interpretive processes in 
interaction.  
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4. A conversational excerpt 
 
In this section I present some data from an interview recorded in the 
autumn of 2005. For reasons of space I will describe only a couple of 
selected passages and concentrate on one brief excerpt, in particular on the 
contribution of one of the two participants, by the fictitious name of Ken, 
which exemplifies some relevant issues. The description will be followed 
by an analysis of the conversation, and a discussion of the interactional 
frames that Ken and myself arguably were operating in, and finally will 
suggest some ways in which we can conceptualize the cognitive 
representations of social values which the participants may have attributed 
to each other.    
I wish to note that, in the discussion that follows, I understand context 
not (only) as a set of fixed demographic variables (e.g. male/female; 
teacher/student) but as the emergent personal stances that participants are 
intent at projecting, and the variable evaluation of which can result in 
mismatches and negative evaluative comments. These projected stances 
entail different opportunities or responsibility for social actions, different 
degrees of authority over subject matters, and consequently different 
discursive identities.  
4.1. Background 
Setting: an ethnographic interview, in which I am interviewing two 
native Japanese speakers (a male, Ken, and a female, Aya), both students 
of applied linguistics. I have met both a few weeks earlier, through an 
introduction by a Japanese colleague, who is their teacher. They know I 
am an Italian researcher of linguistic politeness based in London, and that 
I am collecting data about the social evaluation of certain problematic 
behaviours, including, but not only, intercultural (mis)communication6. 
Ken is slightly older than Aya, but they are classmates, and I have also met 
them at several seminars. I have asked their collaboration for a pilot 
interview, in their double capacity of native Japanese speakers and 
linguists. The interview is conducted over lunch in the university 
restaurant.   
                                                
6 In fact, neither this, nor communicative styles, were the main or only objective of 
my research. The discussion of the ‘incidents’ mentioned in this paper was an 
expedient for the study of other linguistic features.   
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Topic and task: 15 minutes into the interview I propose to discuss some 
instances of what I will call ‘deflected communication’7, several variations 
of which I declare to have experienced many times in Japan. The common 
tread in these episodes is a situation with three participants: myself and 
two other speakers of Japanese, one of whom is my friend and the other 
someone unknown to both (hospital or hotel personnel), or acquaintances 
of my friend to whom I have just been introduced. In these situations, the 
third participant does not address me (or does not reply to me) directly, but 
speaks to or about me addressing my friend instead (note that I do not have 
particular communicative problems in ordinary daily conversations in 
Japanese). I ask both my interviewees how they would evaluate such 
behaviour had they been in my shoes in those circumstances. 
My two interviewees respond in a way that, at the time, I perceive as 
somewhat hesitant, circumspect, and generally noncommittal. My slight 
frustration derives from my assumptions about the nature of this interview, 
which I deliberately conducted informally, over lunch in a restaurant (as 
opposed to college rooms), and which I intend as a collaborative enterprise 
in which I am the novice (the outsider) and they the experts - possibly 
underestimating the fact that I am a much more senior academic, who has 
been introduced to them by their teacher8. I assume they are aware that I 
need their informed opinion, and although I do not expect them to give me 
any ‘black and white’ judgements of the behaviours which I have 
explicitly labelled puzzling and possibly offensive, I feel (with 
considerable concern for my data collection!) that they are reluctant to 
volunteer any comments until I explicitly ask them to do so. When they do 
offer an interpretation, this is generally cast in a ‘generic’ way (i.e. mild 
judgements such as ‘chotto hen desu ne’ = ‘that’s a bit strange’) or light 
polite laughter (and possibly lacking the colourful array of judgemental 
commentaries that I suspect Italian informants would be happy to offer), 
which does not enable me to appreciate their respective evaluations (i.e. 
their positioning vis-à-vis some norms of behaviour). I therefore try to 
trigger an explicit evaluation by attempting to analyze the reasons behind 
such behaviours, and we join the conversation at this point. 
                                                
7 See Lebra 1976:122 for other ritualistic forms of mediated communication in 
Japan.  
8 An additional factor affecting this conversation is of course the relationship 
between Ken (slightly older and senior in school, sempai) and Aya (the kohai), and 
their relation to me (native vs. non-native, students vs. teacher), and the possible 
conceptualization of our respective discourse roles: e.g. (main) addressee vs. side 
participant, in the course of the interview. Gender too could arguably play a role, 
but I will not discuss these aspects in great detail here.   
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4.2. Two excerpts involving evaluations of ‘deflected 
communication’ 
Two passages of the conversation are described below. The first 
begins 14’40’’ and the second 17’30’’ into the conversation (the first five 
minutes of which I have not recorded). The English translation appears 
below the text with transcription and glosses9.  
In the first, we are talking about a nurse in a Tokyo hospital, who—
although I feel perfectly capable of sustaining a conversation—responds 
‘to’ me and talks ‘to’ me by addressing instead the friend who I brought 
along.  
 
0    INT dono       shinri    ga hataraite iru  to omoimasu ka […] 
 which  reasoning NOM  be at work QT   think        Q 
1 Sono kangofu san ga dooshite watashi no tomodachi dake wo mite ha- 
That      nurse       NOM  why         my         friend        only  OBJ  look  
2                           doo kaishaku shimasu ka. 
  (RCST)  how interpret               Q 
3    KEN sore wo mite desu ka? 
 That OBJ look  POL Q 
4    INT ee. Nande watashi no me wo sakete   tomodachi ni = hanas = 
 Yes. Why       my       eye  OBJ  avoid friend              speak 
5    KEN  = tabun =…sono baai dattara   tabun.. nihongo no  
     Maybe         that case  be COND  maybe  Japanese  
6 mondai ja nakute…honto ni, isshokenmei hanashite iru kedo,  
problem   not           truly       endeavor     speak              but  
7 komyunikenshon wa..  dekite     nai n dattara..       shikataganai ka na 
communication  NOM succeed  NEG N be COND    no way          Q  FP 
8 toiu no wa aru   ka mo shirenai desu kedo, komyunikeshon wa  
QT NOM TOP be   perhaps             POL   but   communication TOP 
9 kihontekini torete iru…itte ru koto wa wakaru <2> 
fundamentally succeed say  things TOP understand   
10 tte iu zentei dattara…narete nai kara …        da to omou n desu yo// 
QT premise be COND  be used to NEG because is Q think NOM POL FP 
                                                
9 INT: interviewer; KEN: male interviewee, AYA: female interviewee. COND: 
conditional, FP: clause/sentence final particle, HES: hesitation marker, NEG: 
negative, N: nominalizer; NOM: nominative, OBJ: direct object; PAST: past tense 
marker, POL: polite marker, Q: question marker, QT: quotation marker, RCST: recast 
(the truncated word is marked by “-“); TOP: topic, @: laughter, /: slight fall,  //: 
final fall. Numbers in angular brackets indicate a pause of X seconds. …: indicates 
pauses greater than 0.5 seconds; a colon indicates lengthening. […] indicates a few 
lines omitted as they were repetitions, or, as in line 0 of the English translation, 
words added to the translated version. 
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11   INT  e?    gaikokujin ni? 
 what foreigner    
12   KEN ee// 
 yes 
13  INT a    soo   desu ka// …aa// 
 Is that so POL  Q     I see             
14 KEN kocchi no hoo wo mite iru to anshin suru      to ka@@ 
     this way      OBJ  look       feel reassured  something like 
15 INT aa// 
 I see 
16 AYA sore:mo aru ka na to iu no to..tsukisoi ga sono hito      ga   tsuite kite iru 
That too to be Q FP   QT   N    and  escort NOM this person NOM be with  
17 joo:kyoo: dato: nanka  kanja san: ga..wo kodomo atsukai janai    n desu  
situation  be if   maybe patient     NOM OBJ child      treat     be NEG N POL 
18 kedo, nanka so iu no tte iu no wa, mo-    tatoeba.. roo:jin ni.. oyome  
but  maybe that case  QT  NOM TOP  RCST for ex.    elderly  daughter in law 
19 san ga tuite kite itara  oyome san ni     dake: mite hanasu to ka, ano:  
     NOM accompany if daughter in law only   look  speak  etc .    HES  
20 kookoosei no ko ni okaasan ga tsuite iru to ka, tte ittara okaasan ni dake 
student                 mother  accompany  etc.    in case    mother       only 
21 hanasu toka tte iu no wa…sugoi shitsurei na koto da kedo aru yoo na 
speak  etc.     Q   N  TOP        very  rude           thing be   but    is    like 
22 ki ga suru        n desu yo:  
have a feeling N POL   FP 
23 INT tashika ni ne..watashi wa memai ga suru kara itta n de atte, yappari  
 true           FP    I       TOP dizzy    be  because    NOM   be    in fact  
24 chotto bokete ta ndesu yo,   tashika ni ano: sore ga miete ta       no  
a little dazed PAST N POL FP  true          HES   that nom show PAST N 
25 kamo shirenai…tomodachi ga soo iu fuuni setsumei shita n desu ne 
perhaps             friend        NOM that way      explain PAST  N POL FP 
26 …ano…yappari tsukisoi no hito ni hanashita hooga anzen da to ka…
 well    after all    escort     person       speak        better   safe    is       etc.  
27 soitta bamen         =kara= 
such circumstances from 
28 AYA =nanka= de mo, anzen da janakute…nanka soko dewa...nanikashira no  
maybe         but      safe     be NEG      maybe there TOP     some sort  
29 koo: shinri ga..nanka <6> aru        yoona ki ga shimasu         ne: 
such  reasoning  maybe     there is  like     have an impression FP  
  
 
0   INT what sort of reasoning do you think is [behind] this?  […]  
1-2 Why is the nurse only looking at my friend? How would you interpret 
this?  
3   KEN if I were to witness something like that? 
4   INT yes. Why would she avoid my gaze and only talk to my friend?  
5   KEN maybe…in such a case, if it’s not a problem with the language… if you 
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6-7 are truly making an effort to speak but communication is failing, it’s 
8 possible that one would give up, but if communication is taking 
9-10  place...and she understood what you were saying <2> if that were the 
case…I think…it’s because…she’s not used to [it].        
11 INT to what? Foreigners?  
12 KEN yes. 
13 INT Oh I see. 
14 KEN Looking at your friend she would feel reassured, or something like that.  
15 INT I see. 
16 AYA That too may be possible, but also…maybe when one brings someone 
17-18  along, it’s not exactly like you treat the patient as a child but…somehow 
in cases like that…for example if there’s an elderly person accompanied 
19-20  by his daughter in law, you might only speak and make eye contact with 
her, if you had a high school child accompanied by his mother you might  
21-22 speak to his mother…that would be really rude, but I have the feeling 
that something like that could happen.   
23 INT certainly I did say that I was feeling dizzy, and I was in a bit of a daze, 
24-25 certainly…it is possible that that was apparent…my friend explained it 
26  like this…like, after all…it’s safer to speak to the person accompanying 
27 someone… =from these circumstances. =  
28 AYA  = maybe =, but…not ‘safer’…perhaps in that case…[there would be] 
29 something like a reasoning of some kind <6> I have the feeling that there 
could be [something like that...] 
 
A few minutes later, we begin discussing another, similar, case: I am 
talking to two people, one of whom is my friend, and the other an 
acquaintance of my friend, when the latter asks my friend a question about 
me: “when does she (=me) return to Italy?” 
 
30    INT sorewa yappari kekkoo ki ni natte @@ kanojo wa  itsu    itaria ni  
 that                 quite        be annoyed         she    TOP when Italy  
31  kaeru n      desu ka @@ 
return NOM COP  Q 
32   KEN nanka chokusetu hanashitara <2> shitsurei ni naru   n    janai ka tte 
 well     directly        speak COND        rude   become NOM be NEG Q  QT  
33 omotte iru hito    mo       iru      to omou   n     desu yo ne,    nanka…  
 think         people too there are QT think   NOM POL FP  FP,  something 
34   INT  shitashisugite… 
 too familiar  
35  KEN  nn,  nanka,  konna ni     wakatte nai        no ni,    kyuuni,chokusetsu  
 ehrm maybe, in this way understand NEG though suddenly  directly  
36   hanashikakeru  to.. furanku ni nari      sugiru    yoo na kanji ni 
address        COND  forthright become  too much    sort of  feeling 
37 nacchau kara  <3>   
  become because  
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38  AYA  = sore mo aru:    ka: mo: shirenai:  = 
that too     be        it is possible         
39  KEN  = hai, de, chokusetsu hanasanai to = kaette shitsureina kanji ni 
yes  and  directly       talk NEG COND   rather rude           feeling 
40            nacchau tte iu no wa..   aru          yoona             ki ga shimasu ne. 
 become    QT  NOM TOP  there is  something like have a feeling FP 
41   INT  aa,    yappari  nanka   watashini mushiro kyori wo tamotte hoshii to/ 
 I see, perhaps  in a way   me        rather    distance   keep   want to QT 
42  KEN  nn,    tamotte hoshii           no ka,   tamotoo to shite iru dake nano ka/ 
          yeah  keep want (you) to   NOM Q,  keep        intend to  only be NOM Q  
 
30  INT I was a bit annoyed, [by his asking my friend] “When does she go  
31 back to Italy?” 
32  KEN (It’s that) I think that there are also people who may possibly think it 
33 could be rude to speak directly, you know? I mean… 
34  INT  [it would be] too familiar… 
35 KEN well, mmhh… [they avoid speaking directly] since if you suddenly 
36-37 address someone directly despite not knowing [that person] well 
enough, then it sounds as though one may have become too 
‘casual’…yes…and…  
38  AYA  yes, that too is possible 
39  KEN  yes, and on the other hand if one does not address that person 
40 directly, on the contrary I have the feeling that in some cases it could 
possibly be considered somewhat rude… 
41  INT   ah, so they think they’d prefer me to keep a certain distance  
42  KEN well… mmhh…[I wonder whether]…they want you to keep a 
 distance, or they are rather trying to keep a distance… 
4.3. Analysis 
Is it possible to pin down my perception of evasiveness to some 
specific elements of this verbal exchange? Looking at the last excerpt, I 
think that Ken’s contribution contains several elements that we could call, 
following Caffi (2007), ‘mitigating’ forms. For Caffi, “[…] the basic 
function of mitigators is deresponsibilization with respect to both content 
and addressee.” (2007: 88). Ken uses mitigators in statements that mark 
his own standpoint: “…aru yoona kanji ga shimasu ne.” (= I have the 
feeling that perhaps it could be said that…, in line 40) as well as that of 
other people: “naru n ja nai ka to omotte iru hito” (‘people who could 
possibly think…’, in lines 32-33), “furanku ni nari sugiru yoo na kanji” 
(‘a feeling that it could possibly be too casual [=lit. frank] to…’, in line 
36), which all convey a sense of epistemic distancing or ‘detachment’ 
(Stubbs 1986) vis-à-vis the expressed propositions. Quite perceptively, 
Caffi also notes that “the advantage of deresponsibilization is 
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counterbalanced by the possibility that the mitigated message can have 
contrasting interpretations and hence be ambiguous”. These are of course 
conventional indirect routines frequently used in Japanese, but they 
nevertheless are symptomatic of Ken’s relinquishing authority over his 
interpretations, and avoidance of categorical statements.  
As for the forms that we could call ‘straightforward statements’ (lines 
10 and 33), they are both mitigated by the verb ‘to think’, which “softens 
the force of the assertion”, and projects the impression that “[…] the 
speaker is not too brash, tactless, or domineering” (Maynard 1996: 220). 
Moreover, in responding to my interjection in line 41, while effectively 
rejecting my interpretation, he avoids any explicit signal of disagreement, 
questions my statement, and simply mentions an interpretation that is 
alternative to mine (while possibly leaving the matrix predicate, e.g. ‘I 
don’t know/ I wonder’, or other verb to this effect, unexpressed10).  
Besides these relatively ostensible strategies, we could consider topical 
organizational features of the text expressed by Ken, using Bavelas et al. 
(1990)’s discussion of the broad category of ‘equivocal’ messages. As a 
notional category, ‘equivocation’ is defined as “[…] non-straightforward 
communication, including messages that are ambiguous, indirect, 
contradictory or evasive” (1990: 60)11. A message can be equivocal based 
on the extent to which it ‘blurs’ its relation to any of the situational 
coordinates of Sender (who expresses a viewpoint), Receiver (who is the 
target), Content (what is being expressed) and Context (co-textual 
relationships). We have seen above that Ken uses several devices that 
make viewpoint attribution slightly less distinct or certain (the use of 
distancing evidentials); he also generalizes his statements to refer to 
generic “people” (line 33) rather than the specific case I submitted. In 
terms of content, Ken’s lines 5-10 are the only instance in which I 
obtained a comment on the specific case I am referring to (“[the nurse] is 
not used to foreigners”) but it is noteworthy that even this is not an 
evaluative comment (or minimally so), and the numerous hesitations 
(pauses of one or two seconds) reveal its dispreferred status anyway; 
moreover, the comment is offered only at the end of a ‘double’ account 
(see below on this), which has the effect of delaying and ‘relativizing’ the 
final statement. The two explicit evaluations produced by Ken (lines 32-
33: “it would be rude to speak directly”, and 35-37: “addressing someone 
                                                
10 Ken’s last remark in line 42 could be judged as indirect if understood to be 
incomplete (i.e. lacking a matrix predicate as the one hypothesized above), but its 
form is formally undistinguished from a genuine question, so its ‘incompleteness’ 
could only be confirmed by Ken.  
11 Hence all equivocal messages are indirect but not viceversa.
Stereotyping Communicative Styles  
 
237 
directly may sound too casual”) refer to generic ‘people’ rather than a 
specific case, so while enunciating a social norm, Ken does not position 
himself either in line with or against it12. Finally, in terms of co-textual 
relations, we could note that other comments too are formulated as ‘double 
accounts’ (cf Watanabe 1993’s “multiple accounts”) that provide 
counterpoints to the statements he is about to make: in the first excerpt, 
Ken’s lines 5-10 juxtapose the scenario in which language is a problem—
in which case the nurse could be justified for not talking directly to me—
and the scenario in which language is not a problem—in which case the 
reason is the nurse’s lack of familiarity with foreigners, which could 
potentially cast her as blameworthy. The slow tempo and many pauses 
indeed suggest some hesitation, although Ken tactfully does not commit 
himself to an explicit negative judgment.  In lines 35-37 again he first 
provides a justification for the instance of deflected communication that I 
put to him (by saying that some people may avoid speaking directly to me 
for fear of sounding too ‘casual’, which is a potentially misaligning move 
given my obvious disapproval of that behaviour) only to add a statement 
(lines 39-40) that acknowledges the legitimacy of my irritation (a move 
which arguably realigns our perspectives). These counterpoints provide an 
enlarged, inclusive perspective and effectively reduce his need to take a 
more definite personal stance.  
But perceptions of cautiousness or elusiveness, long-windedness, or 
indeed general indirectness, cannot be fully justified by recourse to a 
cumulative analysis of a number of (indirect) individual linguistic devices, 
or by a one-sided analysis of Ken’s orientation to the topic. Meanings 
cannot be identified independently from the interactional circumstances in 
which they are uttered; they are initiated, developed, and ‘synchronized’ 
between, in relation to, or in response to, the participants themselves and 
their dynamically changing, discursive positions. They are therefore co-
constituted, ‘interactionally achieved’ (Arundale 1999), and interpreted 
through a great deal of circumstantial filtering. The impression of 
indirectness derives rather from the relation13 of the actual message with 
                                                
12 The way he identifies the receiver could also be construed as being mitigated: “if 
they speak directly” in line 32, instead of a more specific “if they speak directly to 
you”. Like in note 10, this is not an intrinsic property of this utterance and 
something that could be only be confirmed by Ken. There is a less generic verb in 
line 36 “to address (you) directly” but again the referent can only be recovered 
pragmatically.  
13 Agha (2007); this is closer to Ervin-Tripp’s (1972: 235) definition of style as 
something defined by co-occurrence rules (syntagmatic relations) and alternation 
rules (or paradigmatic relations). The first define a ‘register’, the latter provide a 
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different kinds of expectations, either pre-existing a conversation (e.g. the 
discursive roles that I expected Ken, Aya and myself to hold during the 
interview: they the experts, me the novice), or being generated through it 
(e.g. the second part of a question/answer pair, certain amounts and types 
of information, etc), which are of course subject to variable conventions 
regarding discourse patterns, as well as acceptable social stances. 
I expected to obtain a discernable positioning (in line with the declared 
purpose of the interview) and I struggled to elicit any. I expected 
interpretations of specific cases, and received (until I forced my 
interviewees to be more precise) interpretations of generalized cases. I 
expected some authoritative statement, and at best I received suggestions 
as to possible interpretations. Although I had hoped that my explicit 
affective evaluation (“I was a bit annoyed”) would cue some sort of 
explicit positioning on Ken’s part, Ken’s response only revealed an 
attempt to remain as neutral as possible. While I was eager to obtain some 
overt indication of Ken’s stances with respect to the specific episodes I 
recounted, this seemed to be a type of information that he was unwilling to 
volunteer. It is clear therefore that my perception was shaped not by an 
unprejudiced, ‘clean-slate’ reading of Ken’s behaviour, but the mismatch 
between my—rather arbitrary and unilateral—expectations, and the type 
of contribution that he was intent in constructing.  
There seemed to be, in other words, a mismatch between their and my 
understanding of the very nature of the situation (the purpose of the 
interview, our roles in it, the amount and type of information that could be 
considered adequate, etc.), i.e. the different “structures of expectations” at 
play, which I will refer to here as different frames. 
The term frame is used in different senses in various disciplinary 
traditions. Tannen distinguishes an interactive notion of frame “[…] in 
Bateson’s and Goffman’s sense, that is, what people think they are doing 
when they talk to each other (i.e. are they joking, lecturing or arguing?)” 
(1993: 6), from ‘knowledge schemas’, which refer to “participant’s 
expectations about people, objects, events and settings in the world” (in 
Shank and Abelson’s or Fillmore’s sense, 1993: 60 ff.)14. While schematic 
knowledge of actional wholes typified by specific lexical items (e.g. buy 
                                                                                                  
contrast with what that style is not; see also Tannen [1984] 2005 ‘conversational 
style’; Hymes 1974: ‘a way or mode of doing something’. 
14 While some find the two concepts distinguishable in principle (e.g. Hanks 
1993:128), Tannen notes that to consider the former ‘dynamic’ (because 
constructed and derived in interaction) and the latter ‘static’ (because they reside in 
speakers’ minds prior to interaction) is unjustified, as even pre-existing 
expectations are continually tested and modified against experience. 
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and sell in Fillmore’s discussion) is of course part of speaker’s 
metalinguistic competence activated in any linguistic interaction, the type 
of knowledge discussed in cognitive semantics is not of immediate 
relevance to the discussion in this paper. So I will use the term frames in 
the Levinsonian sense of an ‘activity type’: “[…] a fuzzy category, whose 
focal members are goal-defined, socially constituted, bounded, events with 
constraints on participants, settings, and so on, but above all on the kinds 
of allowable contributions” (from Clark 1996: 30, my italics). I understand 
knowledge of these frames to constitute part of speakers’ metalinguistic 
and metapragmatic competence (it is linked to speakers’ knowledge of the 
typical linguistic signs associated with certain activities, and to knowledge 
of normalized modes of behaviour) and therefore act as a set of 
expectations regarding typical courses of action. This knowledge is 
constructed through processes of socialization, and it is therefore 
constantly updated in light of new experience. Additionally, as a product 
of socialization practices, frames can evoke cultural dimensions.  
In this paper, as I will explain below, I discuss abstract, generic types 
of frames that are likely to underlie a range of interactional scenarios.  
5. From linguistic signs to interpretive frames and values 
One may well assume the social setting of “ethnographic interview” to 
have universally understood features: “a researcher interviewing an 
informant, who is taken to be an authoritative source, within an established 
domain for the conversation, etc…”, but the possibly heterogeneous 
conceptualizations of discursive roles and practices that participants bring 
to it mean that it is by no means a ‘universal frame’.  
One’s course of action in a specific situation is determined by one’s 
assessment not only of hierarchical relationships or group membership 
(factors that are routinely mentioned in explaining interactional behaviour) 
but also in terms of what actors know about conventionalized ‘modes of 
participation’, or frames, such as ‘cooperation’ and ‘competition’ 
(Jackendoff 2007: 176)15. My expectations, conduct, and response to 
Ken’s conduct in the interview suggest the possibility that two different 
models for ethnographic interviews were at play: a competitive one in 
which the participants are able to contribute with different individual 
                                                
15 The poles of cooperativeness and competition can be seen as one of the variable 
dimensions that can characterize joint activities (see Clark 1996: 31). The others, 
which I do not discuss explicitly here, are: scriptedness (vs. unscriptedness), 
formality (vs. informality), verbality (vs non-verbality) and governance (egalitarian 
vs. autocratic).   
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stances, envisage the task as a game of minds in which a ‘winning’ 
argument leads to a specific outcome which eliminates other possible 
outcomes, and feel bound only by the task at hand, and a collaborative 
one, in which the participants feel bound to maintain interactional 
alignment, envisage the task’s outcome as the result of mutual agreement, 
and feel bound to each other in some (social, affective) capacity, beyond 
the task at hand. 
So while my questioning attempted to prompt an explicit marking of 
my interviewees’ stance vis-à-vis the episodes I recounted, aimed at 
obtaining a definitive conclusion, and proposed interpretations that I 
wanted to be explicitly accepted or challenged (in line with my 
competitive frame), my interviewees’ contribution seemed to aim at 
maintaining some kind of overarching alignment and achieve a non-
exclusive conclusion that reflected multiple positions (in line with a 
collaborative frame).  
It is at this level of conceptualization, that of frame, that the 
constellation of linguistic signals makes sense: “[…] global predictions or 
expectations provide the ground against which possible ambiguities at the 
perceptual, or sequential levels can be resolved” (Gumperz 1992: 233). So 
understanding a frame provides us with an enriched interpretation of the 
utterances, and the various mitigators and instances of ‘equivocal’ 
messages I described above are less ‘equivocal’ in light of the aims of a 
participant working in a collaborative frame. If giving opinions positions 
people and has the potential to reveal their misalignment, a way to 
maintain alignment is by blurring the edges of a stance. 
It should not be thought that Ken is just ‘hiding’ an explicit stance, that 
should theoretically be invariably expressed in any interview—by the 
mechanisms I described above he is intent in constructing his ‘scene’, a 
rather rich scene, in which some meanings are being highlighted and 
others shaded. The totality of his (verbal) behaviour makes this scene 
public and available to interpretation (although my interpretation may or 
may not coincide with the meanings or stances Ken had meant to project: 
Arundale 1999: 131); his stance is woven in relation to my own stance and 
interpretable against it. Once I made my stance explicit by casting these 
episodes as ‘problematic’, or by stating that “I was a bit annoyed” by 
them, I produced an alignment vis-à-vis the events that constrained Ken’s 
subsequent positioning16. In the context of our relationship (as newly 
                                                
16 DuBois maintains that taking a stance means performing three acts: by 
evaluating something we (causally and inferentially) position ourselves with 
respect to others, and by positioning ourselves we align ourselves with others 
(2007: 163). 
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acquainted parties, bearers of different positions in the academic 
hierarchy, age, gender and cultural background) Ken’s stancetaking was 
indeed a delicate matter. Ken used an indirect style to resolve a potential 
interactional tension. At the same time however, his stance was an 
expression of his social morality, and was indexical of a broader 
sociocultural framework (Englebretson 2007: 3). 
While claiming that his stance evokes presupposed systems of 
sociocultural values (see DuBois 2007: 139) I by no means intend to claim 
that the same sociocultural values apply to the whole of Japanese society, 
or even that this is a constant character of Ken’s behaviour across any type 
of situation, setting, or participant frameworks—on the contrary, it is very 
much symbiotic to my own behaviour. But to the extent that his behaviour 
in this situation can be said to display a perceivably coherent character, 
other participants would ascribe their interpretations to him and hold him 
accountable for a specific social and moral ideology. 
The discussion that follows is schematized in figures 11-1 and 11-2. 
The signs that Ken has provided me with (linguistic signs) are, to me, 
indices of a coherent style (an indirect style); but while indirectness is an 
emergent property of conversation (a metasemiotic result of the relation of 
linguistic signs with specific co-textual and contextual conditions17), it is 
also the input for further metasemiotic generalizations (these facts are 
indicated by the upward arrows; inverse processes relating to how one’s 
value system affects one’s verbal behaviour are represented by the 
downward arrows). I noted earlier that an indirect style can be evaluated in 
different ways: positive (creating rapport) or negative (being evasive). At 
the time of the interview, I perceived it negatively—Ken’s style frustrated 
my expectations in many ways, including my (interested) research agenda. 
With the revised analytic agenda that I have for the purpose of this paper, 
and under the different conditions in which I can now approach the text (a 
detached post-facto analysis, free of the constraints of real-time face-to-
face interaction), I will try instead to describe the mechanisms that subtend 
generalizations from linguistic signs to value attribution and how these can 
lead to (negative) evaluations.  
Before I do that, I need to clarify the terminology I will use, in 
particular in relation to values, which is inspired by Jackendoff (2007). A 
value is, for Jackendoff, a conceptualized abstract property (hence not 
something existing in the “real” world), associated with (conceptualized) 
objects, persons, and actions, and that serves as an intermediary in a 
system of “folk logic”. Crucially, value is not a unitary notion, but can be 
                                                
17 As opposed to an ‘anticipated’ product of the conversation (see Clark 1996: 22). 
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broken down in various sub-values (e.g. affective-, utility-, normative-, 
quality-, esteem-value etc.). Variability in what (sub-)values are associated 
with what entities is what engenders cross-and intra-cultural variation 
(2007: 277 ff.). For instance, in some Japanese circles, going out for a 
drink with colleagues at the end of the day is de rigueur (the activity 
therefore is associated with a high normative-value), and the social payoff 
(i.e. the strengthening of group membership) may also be high (a high 
utility-value) but some people may feel a strong dislike for the inebriated 
crowds of the late train they have to catch after the drinking session (i.e. 
assign the activity a low affective-value): this may alter—devalue or 
undermine—their overall evaluation of the event, even though one 
recognizes the high normative- and utility-value of going out for a drink. 
Here, I will comment only on a few types of value that are relevant to 
my discussion. Lastly, let us note that each value is explicated (see the top 
part of the figures) in terms of ‘principles’ (or ‘input rules’), that give 
grounds for assigning values to objects, people and actions, and 
‘guidelines’ (or ‘output rules’) that spell out how the principles affect 
behaviour.  Each principle specifies what gives the value a high and a low 
valence: for example, for the affective-value, the high valence reads: 
“harmonious discussion feels good”, and conversely the low valence 
reads: e.g. “disharmonious discussion feels bad” (the negative values are 
omitted, for the sake of simplicity, from the tables). The examples of 
principles and procedures that I use for each value are just indicative—
many others could be assumed. 
 
 
 VALUE TYPE PRINCIPLES      >    PROCEDURES  
               (settings of values)                   (guidelines for action) 
 
 affective value       a harmonious discussion  >  do what promotes  
  feels good   harmony  
 utility value          smooth conversation  >  avoid open 
               is beneficial    disagreement,            
                                                                                              misalignment 
 normative value respecting other people’s  >  minimize 
  viewpoints is good   egocentric statements 
 …   …    … 
  
      ACTIVITY FRAME: COOPERATION 
 
            
 
             METASIGN:  indirect style  
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                 
          LINGUISTIC SIGNS 
        epistemic distancing  (lines 32-33, 36-37, 40) 
        generalizing referents (line 33) 
        inclusion of multiple viewpoints in accounts (lines 5-10, 35-40) 
        signalling of disagreement through interrogative recast (line 42) 
        etc… 
 
 
Figure 11-1: From linguistic signs to values – cooperative frame and 
concomitant values 
 
 
 VALUE TYPE PRINCIPLES       >    PROCEDURES  
                (settings of values)   (guidelines for action) 
 
 affective value   a competitive discussion  >  solicit clear-cut 
  feels good   arguments and stances 
 utility value   argumentative conversation  >  open disagreement  
  is beneficial   is acceptable 
 normative value challenging other people’s  >  egocentric  
  viewpoints is good   statements are ok 
 …  …    … 
 
                ACTIVITY FRAME: COMPETITION 
 
 
           
           METASIGN:  direct style  
 
                
           LINGUISTIC SIGNS 
         (epistemic commitment) 
         (single viewpoint) 
                         etc.… 
 
 
Figure 11-2: From linguistic signs to values – competitive frame and 
concomitant values 
 
From Ken’s verbal behaviour I could assume his preference for non-
categorical statements about a specific individual’s behaviour, his 
inclination to express his stance inferentially rather than explicitly, his 
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unwillingness to engage in direct argumentation with another participant, 
his preference for inclusive accounts. At this level18, my interpretation and 
my attribution of an ‘indirect style’ to Ken’s performance is textual and 
based on systemic properties.   
A descriptive linguist may stop just there; but as members of different 
social groups and bearers of different cultural values, our interpretation 
normally goes further: we judge people based on the way they talk and 
against our parameters of ’normality’, i.e. the normalized behaviours that 
we are familiar with (though we may not actively behave so ourselves). 
This requires a reflexive model of behaviour that tells us how people are 
supposed to act in that specific interactional context. This model includes 
acquired scripts for specific situations, and corresponds to what I here call 
‘frame’ (see 4.3).  
Any individual who, like Ken, has been socialized to a notion that 
stating opinions to near strangers in a public, semi-formal context must be 
done as collaboratively as possible, will find Ken’s verbal behaviour and 
stance perfectly natural—possibly unremarkable. An individual may hold, 
or be familiar with, a set of values consistent with that behaviour and 
stance: s/he will assume that Ken assigns a high affective-value 
(specifying what feels good or bad) and a high utility-value (specifying 
costs and benefits) to diplomatic, harmonious conversation; that he is 
conforming to a normative value (a moral code of conduct) that dictates 
inclusiveness and stigmatizes egocentrism (figure 11-1).   
But as individuals accustomed to a competitive frame (figure 11-2), in 
which it is an argumentative, animated discussion that is associated with a 
sense of satisfaction (high affective-value) and beneficial effects (high 
utility-value), and in which personal, self-asserting statements are 
perfectly compatible with norms of acceptable behaviour (normative-
value), the verbal signs provided in Ken’s performance generate some 
kind of discomfort and dissonance. Those signs are indeed likely to be 
evaluated negatively (i.e. to hold low affective-, utility-, normative-
values), as we have seen with the charges of ambiguity, evasiveness, 
vagueness, or lack of logic. The extent to which we can make sense of 
Ken’s behaviour depends uniquely on our familiarity with his value 
system (and the corresponding frame). As bearers of different value 
systems (or as uninformed novices in intercultural encounters, the 
prototypical case of the language and culture learner), our responses to 
Ken’s behaviour can range from complete bewilderment to mild 
                                                
18 Please note that I am not suggesting any temporal sequencing in the interpretive 
processes, and reference to different levels of, or different points in participants 
interpretation depends on the sequence of my analysis.  
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frustration, because we fail to find coherence between the values we 
entertain (and that affect our judgement) and the verbal signals that Ken 
displays; we lack knowledge or understanding of the interpretive frame.  
The case of the language learner exemplifies the extreme case where 
values are not shared, and possibly also not known—in fact, often a crucial 
discovery in language and culture learning is that different values exist 
even for what we may consider ‘universal truths’. But the community of 
users of Japanese language of course also includes individuals who do not 
actively share Ken’s values (for example, those who assign a higher 
utility-value to challenging and being challenged in one’s views; those 
who attach a higher affective-value to direct challenges, etc.), but are 
familiar with them. Such individuals are unlikely to be entirely puzzled by 
Ken’s indirectness: they would be able to recognize his behaviour as one 
of many models of behaviour. They may still evaluate it negatively, but 
this will be an informed evaluation of Ken’s values, not the result of one’s 
unilateral and absolutist reading of the ‘rules of the game’. 
The point is that frames and values have to be learned. We cannot 
experience values directly (although we may infer them from 
metapragmatic comments) and we do so through experience of frames, or 
the scripts that (we have learned to assume) regulate behaviour. Repeated 
exposure to such frames allows us to find coherence19 in behavioural 
models, and make sense of them; lack of experience can give rise to 
negative judgements. 
The values underlying a frame are evinced from the use of specific 
linguistic signs, but of course need to receive validation in some sort of 
folk reasoning. Many ethnographic commentaries on Japan have indeed 
highlighted the types of values I mentioned above (see e.g. Lebra 1976), 
such as preference for non-conflictual argumentation or inclusiveness; in 
particular, the dislike for egocentric stances has been noted in a recent 
study on apologetic metapragmatic comments (Pizziconi 2007). In the 
excerpt presented here, Ken produced two explicit enunciations of 
normative behaviour (though these are phrased as norms he knows of and 
not necessarily as norms he personally subscribes to): “speaking directly 
                                                
19 Of course, lack of (apparent) coherence is often picked up on in daily 
conversations (e.g. contradictions between one’s stated morality and one’s 
actions), but here I refer to a requirement for mutual coordination, that makes us 
attribute value in consistent ways; coherence is a function of the subjective degree 
of match between our notion of which values go with which signs, and mismatches 
are possible since a value is actually a composite result of many sub-values which 
may have mismatches. 
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may be rude” (lines 32-33) and “addressing someone directly may sound 
too casual” (lines 35-37).   
However, even when we recognize ‘normalized models of behaviours’ 
or enunciable social norms, we need to consider that they are not 
necessarily universally subscribed to by the whole of the Japanese people, 
and they are not the same as ‘normative models’, i.e. models 
unquestioningly accepted as standards. Sociolinguistic competence 
requires an appreciation of finer distinctions with regards to the kind of 
people that those models are subscribed by, the social purposes that such 
models serve, and how broadly they are adopted in society. Failure to 
make these distinctions results in stereotyping overgeneralizations. There 
are several discussions of this issue from a social, or social-psychological 
point of view (see e.g. Eelen 2001 and Agha 2007), but here I would like 
to note the very simple psychological process that inhibits such 
distinctions. As we move from the recognition of linguistic signs (i.e. as 
signs belonging to the Japanese language, with specific referential 
meanings, indexing specific illocutionary stances, etc.) to attributions of 
values (something that happens early on in language learning), we move 
onto the much fuzzier area of social cognition. It is here that a seamless 
but crucial leap can be made between the evidence available to me (Ken’s 
value preferences as an individual), which has a ‘subjective’ character, and 
a generalization to other people ‘like’ Ken, or possibly the whole of the 
Japanese country, which has an ‘objective’ character, and for which I may 
not have much evidence. In other words, although all we could 
legitimately conclude is that “non-competitive discussion feels good to 
Ken” (a ‘subjective’ formulation) what we often conclude is that “non-
competitive discussion feels good” (an ‘objective’ formulation; see 
Jackendoff 2007: 239)20. As a matter of fact, unjustified and unsupported 
by any evidence as it is, this kind of reasoning is fairly common, and 
indeed very human. Stereotyping is a way to simplify complexities, and 
                                                
20 In Jackendoff’s discussion this is seen as a process whereby we arbitrarily 
attribute our own subjective take to others; here, I note the similar effects of 
attributing somebody else’s subjective take to others. Another interesting 
implication of the distinction between subjective and objective conceptualizations 
of values pointed out by Jackendoff (2007: 241) is that when someone’s subjective 
judgement is consistent with objective judgements this accrues another type of 
value (esteem-value, both self-esteem or the esteem of those who share the same 
value). However, when someone’s subjective judgement conflicts with the 
‘objective’ judgement this generates loss of (self- or other’s) esteem. If I am wrong 
my self-esteem goes down, if you are wrong, you are “uncultured, savage, lacking 
in values”. In our case, ‘vague, inscrutable, illogic’.  
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recognizing differences inevitably increases complexity. But the extra 
effort (cognitive and material) needed to account for variability also 
clashes with the need for simplification and economy that governs 
language classrooms.  
6. Summary  
The discussion above illustrated the mechanisms involved in the 
perception and evaluation of a speaker’s conversational style. Linguistic 
forms are of course the means by which speakers signal their orientation to 
values, but since the same linguistic signs (including the metasign of 
‘indirect style’) may, and often do, have different interactional valences in 
different value systems21, a rigid interpretation of their meanings based on 
one’s own system of values carries the risk of misattribution.  
I have tried to show the mechanisms that link the reading of an 
individual’s verbal behaviour to judgements of personhood. Crucial to an 
understanding of the significance of an indirect style are the participant 
assumptions regarding the type of activity one is taking part in, its 
purposes, the participating roles it prescribes, and how it relates to long-
term goals beyond the immediate activity undertaken, i.e. their respective 
frames. The frames assumed in this study are generic relational frames that 
describe types of “joint actions”: cooperative or competitive. Frames shape 
the linguistic contributions from their inception, and are not just a ‘last 
resort’ bit of context, which can be invoked for interpretation to ‘fill in’ 
the gaps in semantic or syntactic meaning (Clark 1996: 58). The lack of a 
common ground in this mediating plane is responsible for mismatches in 
one’s expectations, and potential miscommunication, even when 
communication seems to proceed with no major hiccups at a lower, 
denotational level, at a local pragmatic level, etc.  
It is well known that inaccurate form-function mappings are 
responsible for a great deal of language learners’ pragmatic failure. As 
‘capsules’ of human knowledge and understanding about types of 
interactional patterns that are normally below one’s awareness (Hanks 
1993: 129), frames are even more sensitive components of interactions. 
Participants in speech events hold others accountable for their 
communicative actions but are likely to invoke linguistic signs, rather than 
frames, in interpretive or argumentative reasoning about what is going on. 
We have seen this in many commentaries on the Japanese style, including 
                                                
21 Tannen [1984] 2005 talks of ‘pragmatic homonimy’, i.e. the different 
interpretation of the same devices. 
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the quotation from Clancy at the beginning of this paper, that 
deterministically explain perceptions of evasiveness on the basis of 
linguistic features of the Japanese language, leaving the ‘evaluator’s’ 
assumptions regarding the expected goals and features of the exchange 
unquestioned. Yet, we have seen how our expectations about the relevant 
‘scripts’ for joint activities crucially affects our cognitive as well as 
affective evaluation of the effectiveness (or even comprehensibility) of a 
communicative exchange. In pedagogical contexts, it is important to 
highlight how frames condition verbal behaviour, and how they reflect and 
affect speaker’s stances towards the task at hand and the relationship with 
other participants. This is not the same as teaching language with a 
situational syllabus: scripts for post-office or restaurant encounters are 
more institutionalized and conventionalized than those for stating opinions 
(during ethnographic interviews, in a university seminar, or at a dinner 
party). Learners can benefit from guidance (and awareness raising) on how 
one’s assumptions about goals and participant roles affect communication. 
Values are complex concepts, and can be described in terms of clusters 
of more specific sub-values that may have different valences for different 
individuals. This conceptualization of values allows us to account for 
culture-internal variation and reduce the drawbacks of necessary 
pedagogical simplifications. The implication for teaching is that no single 
account of ‘cultural values’ is likely to offer an exhaustive and non-
stereotypical account of the social meaning of linguistic forms. When 
offering explanations of this or that form, conventional expression, 
lexeme, etc. a teacher/textbook may variably resort to a type of morality 
(“when complimented it is good to deny the compliment and show 
modesty”), a particular feeling (“it is considered clumsy to say no 
directly”), or a social norm (“even when you disagree, it is tatemae [=the 
socially accepted thing to do, see Doi 1986] not to do so directly”). None 
of these explanations is ‘more’ true than the others, nor are they 
necessarily all true at the same time either. They can only be true for 
someone, and the argumentative positioning—the ideology—that they 
presuppose needs to be addressed directly.  
7. Conclusion 
I have assumed that the abundance of claims about Japanese 
indirectness must be taken as genuine perceptions on the part of users, and 
although distinctions need to be made about what indirectness ‘means’, 
how socially widespread it is, in what situations it is deployed, and what 
argumentative positions it sustains (which needs extensive empirical 
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testing), we need to acknowledge the existence of such perceptions, and 
account for it in pedagogical contexts. Japanese language no doubt makes 
extensive use of an indirect style—a style conveyed through the use of 
several grammaticalized and discourse-based devices—but evidence is 
available that suggests that this style is subject to a great deal of personal 
and situational variation, a fact that Japanese language instruction needs to 
proclaim more audibly (Matsumoto and Okamoto 2003: 34). When an 
indirect style is selected, this conveys information on the speaker’s 
orientation in relation to other participants. In this study we have seen that 
this may conflict with the goals of the task (as understood by one 
participant), but also that it indexes the speaker’s priorities: interactional, 
rather than transactional concerns. Indirect styles can be used to index 
speakers’ affective and social values, which assign importance to 
harmonious, non-conflictual stances, and condition the nature of the 
interactional frame. 
Language forms can be indirect, but indirectness is not a fixed property 
of the Japanese language. The structure of the language cannot “foster 
ambiguity” but it can be exploited to convey ambiguity when this is the 
very meaning that speakers wish to express. Speakers can be indirect, 
vague, and ambiguous, but indirectness is also not an intrinsic property of 
speakers either; it is the result of a semiotic process in which several signs 
are perceived to converge to convey a consistent register of linguistic use, 
functional to the expression of alignment. The degree of indirectness we 
perceive is also a function of participants’ goals and expectations (our 
frames), and therefore it is an emergent property of specific interactions. 
Language teaching must avoid deterministic statements about the ‘spirit’ 
of the Japanese language, or essentializing statements about the 
preferences of a generic Japanese speaker, and focus on the goals of 
participants in situated activities, which are subject to variations in the 
stances, identities, and morality displayed.  
Previous contrastive analyses of Japanese argumentation strategies 
(Watanabe 1993 contrasts them with American strategies) have argued 
that there are systematic cross-cultural differences at the framing level. In 
this study, I did not confirm nor disprove that this may be the case, but I 
argued that different settings in the clusters of sub-values in an individual 
value system allow for variation within a broadly shared cultural 
orientation. Each interaction provides evidence of an individual’s belief 
system, his/her orientation towards norms of behaviour and affective 
preferences towards patterns of interaction. Whether the collaborative 
frame and the underlying values I have described can be generalized to 
other groups in Japanese society is an empirical matter that depends on the 
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frequency of occurrence of such behaviour. A truly pluralistic education 
requires that teachers contextualize their own interpretations and 
evaluations, and accompany such interpretations with reference to other 
value systems, for other ‘types’ of people (e.g. different generations, 
genders, different political or sexual orientations, etc.)22. As a kind of ‘gate 
keeper’, a teacher carries great responsibility in the creation and 
sustenance of normative models, and the potential perpetuation of 
stereotypes and prejudice.  
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